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NOTES

TWENTY-YEARS OF DIMINISHING PROTECTION: A
PROPOSAL TO RETURN TO THE WADE TRILOGY'S
STANDARDS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years have elapsed since the United States Supreme
Court decided the landmark trilogy of pre-trial identification cases:
United States v. Wade,' Gilbert v. California,2 and Stovall v.
Denno.3 These cases established that the denial of counsel to a defendant appearing in a pre-trial identification constituted a violation
of the sixth amendment right to counsel, 4 and that suggestive identification procedures could be violative of due process. 5
Pre-trial identifications exist in three basic forms: the showup,6
1. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
2.

388 U.S. 263 (1967). See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.

3.

388 U.S. 293 (1967). See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.

4. Wade, 388 U.S. at 223-27. This Note does not address the right to counsel issue, and
will mention it only in passing. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding
that the right to counsel begins once a person is formally charged by indictment or information); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing that the sixth amendment right
to counsel could be applied to protect other specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights). See
generally Panel Discussion, The Role of the Defense Lawyer at a Lineup in Light of the
Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273 (1968); Read, Lawyers at Lineups: ConstitutionalNecessity or Avoidable Extravagence?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 339 (1969);
Note, Protection of the Accused at Police Lineups, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 345 (1970);
Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967) (all discussing the role of the defense
lawyer at a lineup).
5.

Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.

6.

A showup consists of the defendant being exhibited alone to the witness. See Neil v.

Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 195 (1972); N. SOBEL.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS § 1.2, at 4 (2d ed. 1981).

EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND
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the lineup,' and the photographic identification.' This Note concentrates primarily on the lineup, since it is the identification technique
preferred by commentators, 9 and the fairest form of identification for
the defendant.10
This Note first addresses the creation of the Supreme Court's
due process standard for criminal identifications." The trend away
from the Wade protections is then examined,'12 as well as the effect
that this trend has had on lower federal courts.'3 The development of
the federal standard is then contrasted with the development of the
New York State constitutional standard, which affords greater protection to defendants.' 4
II.

THE EARLY CASES: WADE, GILBERT, STOVALL, AND SIMMONS

In Wade the defendant was convicted of robbery after being
identified in a lineup at which he was denied counsel.' 5 The defendant appealed, claiming that the lineup violated his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination,' 6 and his sixth amendment right
to counsel. 17 The Supreme Court, after dismissing the fifth amend7. In a lineup the suspect is placed with a number of other people, and the witness is
then asked if he or she can identify which person, if any, is the suspect. The advantage of the
lineup is that it provides the police with fairly strong evidence of identity, since the witness had
a number of suspects from which to choose. See Williams & Hammelmann, Identification
Parades-I, 1963 CRIm. L. REv. 479, 480.

8. Photographic identification exists in two forms. In the photo array, the witness is
shown a number of photos simultaneously, one of which is of the suspect. This method is the
photographic equivalent of a lineup, and is the preferable method. See Sobel, Assailing the
Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-TrialCriminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 261, 264 (1971). The second form is one in which the
witness is shown only the defendant's photo, and is asked to make an identification. This
method is analogous to a showup, and has been criticized by commentators. Id. See also N.
SOnEL, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 1-4 (Supp. 1985) (noting that this method indicates that the
police believe that "that's the man").
9. See N. SOaL, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 5 (Supp. 1985); Sobel, supra note 8, at 264.
10. The Lineup is nevertheless subject to manipulation. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 229
(stating "It is obvious that risks of suggestion attend either form of confrontation and increase
the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification."). See also Williams & Hammelmann, supra
note 7,at 481-90 (noting that reliability of lineups is not as great as it may seem); Note,
Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the
Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779, 795 (1971) (noting that lineups can impart subtle suggestion).
II. See infra notes 15-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 59-108 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 109-126 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 127-202 and accompanying text.
15. Wade, 388 U.S. at 220.
16. Id. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ...."
17.

Wade, 388 U.S. at 220. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions,
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ment claim,18 held that the denial of an attorney to the defendant

during the lineup violated his constitutional right to counsel. 19 Recognizing the seriousness of the lineup in the pre-trial proceedings,
the Court noted that a lineup is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, 20 and that "the potential for substantial prejudice to the ac-

cused"' 21 exists because of "the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification. 22 A critical issue which arose, after the finding of a
constitutional violation, was whether to permit an in-court identification of the defendant. 23 The defendant moved to strike the in-court
identification, a sanction which would have greatly hindered the
state's case.24 25The Court, however, felt that such a sanction would be
"unjustified,"

rule 26

and opted instead to follow the independent source

which provides that the in-court identification would only be

the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
18. Wade, 388 U.S. at 221-23. For a discussion of self-incrimination and identification
procedures, see Murray, The Criminal Lineup at Home and Abroad, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 610,
611-14; Comment, Regulation and Enforcement of Pre-Trial Identification Procedures, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1296-97 (1969).
19. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-39. The sixth amendment issue is not relevant to this Note.
For a thorough discussion of the effect of Wade on police lineups, see Note, Right to Counsel
at Police IdentificationProceedings:A Problem in Effective Implementation of an Expanding
Constitution, 29 U. PiTT. L. REV. 65 (1967). See generally supra note 4 and accompanying
authority (discussing role of lawyers at lineups).
20. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
21. Id. at 232.
22. Id. at 235.
23. Id. at 220. During the course of a trial, it is an asset to the prosecution to have a
victim or witness of a crime identify the suspect in front of the jury. This is known as the "incourt identification." See Sobel, supra note 8, at 267-68; Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection,26 STAN. L. REV. 1097,
1097 (1974). This identification can be bolstered by testimony of a positive identification at a
"pre-trial identification," such as a lineup. Bolstering strengthens the accuracy of the in-court
identification in the minds of the jury. By testifying as to a previous identification, the witness
appears doubly certain that "this is the man." See N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 4.3, at 13-23.
Since the prior lineup identification in Wade was elicited by the defense, testimony concerning
it was not subject to suppression. Had the prosecution brought out testimony of the pre-trial
identification on direct examination, then the conviction would have had to been reversed. See
N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 4.1(b), at 3 (Supp. 1986).
24. Absent an in-court identification, the only way to connect the defendant to the crime
is through documentary evidence, such as fingerprints, which can be harder to obtain and are
less dramatic. Thus, in-court identifications play an important role in the prosecution's case.
See Sobel, supra note 8, at 268; Note, Manson v. Brathwaite: Lookingfor the Silver Lining in
the Area of Eyewitness Identifications, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1978).
25. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
26. An independent source gives the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the identification would have occurred even without the proper lineup. The independent source rule had
previously been applied in other areas of criminal law. See Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114, 124 n.I (Murphy, J., dissenting) (discussing application of independent source to
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permitted if the government could establish by "clear and convincing
evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification. '27 The Court
considered a number of factors in determining whether an independent source existed:
the witness' prior opportunity to observe the alleged crime;28
the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup
description and the defendant's actual appearance;28
identification by picture of the defendant by the witness prior to
the lineup;30
any identification prior to the lineup of another person; 31
failure by the witness to identify the defendant on a prior

occasion; 32
the time lapse between the alleged crime and the lineup. 3

The Court also noted that other facts which are disclosed concerning
the lineup's conduct are relevant. 34
Gilbert v. California" presented the Court with a different issue
than Wade. The defendant in Gilbert was identified in a lineup
which was viewed simultaneously by approximately one hundred persons, all victims of his robberies.3 " This unconventional identification
procedure was compounded by the fact that the defendant was not
provided with a lawyer.3 7 Unlike Wade, where testimony concerning
the pre-trial identification came out under cross-examination 38 the
testimony in Gilbert was elicited by the prosecution as part of its
direct case.39 As a result, the admissibility of both the pre-trial and
the in-court identifications was in question.
wiretapping).

27. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
28. Id. at 241.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The logic behind the independent source rule is compelling. Consider the case of
a robbery victim who viewed his attacker for ten minutes in good light. Is his in-court identification more likely to be based on his memory of the robbery, or of a suggestive lineup? To
prohibit his in-court identification because of a poorly conducted lineup would be carrying the
sanction to an illogical extreme. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 251 (White, J., dissenting).
35. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
36. Id. at 269-71.
37. Id. at 269.
38. See supra note 23.
39. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The Court, following the Wade analysis, held that admitting the
in-court identifications without first determining whether they arose
from an independent source was constitutional error. 40 The question
of the pre-trial identification was then addressed, and it was held
that a per se exclusionary rule should be adopted; 4 1 the prosecution
would not be permitted to show an independent source for the pretrial identification. As the Court reasoned, "Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure
that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right .... 42
There is a strong argument in favor of excluding an in-court
identification. This type of exclusionary rule would force law enforcement officials to respect the accused's constitutional rights, or
face the possibility of a not guilty verdict. Fearing that an exclusionary rule applied by itself would be too severe, however, the Court in
43
Wade and Gilbert chose instead to establish a dual standard.
First, in-court identifications following an improper pre-trial
lineup or showup 44 will be permitted only if the prosecution can show
45
that such in-court identification arises from an independent source;
and second, testimony concerning an improper pre-trial identification
is subject to a per se exclusionary rule, and will not be permitted.4
While both Wade and Gilbert were concerned primarily with the
right to counsel, the third case in the trilogy, Stovall v. Denno47 focused on an entirely different matter and established the standard
upon which this Note is based.
In Stovall the defendant was convicted of murder.4 After being
arrested, he was taken to the hospital where the witness was recovering.49 While handcuffed to a police officer, he was identified by the
witness. 50 The use of this identification aided in the conviction.
Thereafter, the defendant appealed, claiming violations of his sixth
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 272.
Id. at 273.
Id.
See Sobel, supra note 8, at 268-69; Note, supra note 10, at 781.
An improper identification is one in which counsel was denied and/or the identifica-

tion violated due process. See supra notes 15-43 and accompanying text, and infra notes 52-58
and accompanying text.

45.

Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.

46.
47.

Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
388 U.S. 293 (1967).

48. Id. at 295.
49.

Id.

50. Id.
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amendment right to counsel and fifth and fourteenth amendment
due process rights.51
The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the
defendant's due process rights were violated because the state had
allegedly failed to apply his fifth amendment rights adequately. In
deciding this issue, the Court noted that a defendant is entitled to
relief if the identification was "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due
process of law." ' 2
A majority of the Court held that this showup, despite the defendant's having been viewed alone and in handcuffs, was not unnecessarily suggestive.5" The Court reasoned that the "totality of the
circumstances" 54 must be examined in determining suggestiveness.
While this standard gives some direction to the Court's position,
room still exists for judicial interpretation.5 5 The Court stated a "totality of the circumstances" test without enumerating the requisite
factors that should be used. The Court, in examining totality, looked
only to the factors surrounding the identification. 6 Factors bearing
on the crime were not discussed, thus indicating that the Wade standards for independent source, which include factors based on observation of the crime,57 were not to be applied to the totality test.
The reasoning behind this standard seems logical. If the lineup
was not suggestive, then the pre-trial lineup testimony is permissible;
if it was suggestive, then the testimony about it should not be allowed. In contrast, the in-court identification is likely to be a product
of both the crime itself and the pre-trial identification. If, by meeting
the independent source criteria set out in Wade, it can be shown that
the in-court identification rests primarily on remembrance of the
51.

Id. at 296.
52. Id. at 302 (citing Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966)). See Recent
Cases, Criminal Procedure:Admissibility of In-court Identifications-UnnecessarilySuggestive
Out-of-Court Identifications-Due Process, II AKRON L. REV. 763, 766-67 (1978).
53. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
54. Id.
55. See United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, 914-915 (2d
Cir.)(Friendly, J.)(stating that "Although at first sight (the Stovall test) seems fairly simple
and straight forward, it has given rise to difficult problems .... ), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908
(1970). See also Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Process Test
Falls to Meet Its Own Criteria, I I U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 55 (1981) (noting the Court's failure
to define totality); Note, supra note 10, at 781 (finding "no precise guidelines").
56. The Court noted that the hospital was not far from the jail, that no one knew how
long the witness would live, and that the witness could not visit the jail. Stovall, 388 U.S. at
302.
57. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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crime, then the in-court identification is permissible." If the prosecution cannot meet the Wade criteria, then any in-court identification
would be based on the improper lineup, and thus would not be
permitted.
The importance of Stovall is that it helps to define the Wade
and Gilbert rules by giving some meaning to the phrase "improper
identification." The Stovall rule would, therefore, be applied before
the Wade and/or Gilbert rules: If a lineup is improper under
Stovall, then Wade and/or Gilbert are applied; if the lineup is
proper, however, Wade and Gilbert do not become an issue.
Despite the gains made by the Wade trilogy, further refinement
was necessary to give lower courts guidance in applying the rules."
The Supreme Court considered the identification issue again in Simmons v. United States,60 where it further defined the standards.
The defendant in Simmons was convicted of bank robbery after
being identified through use of a photographic identification. 1 The
defendant challenged the use of the photographs as being so unduly
prejudicial as to fatally taint his conviction. No challenge was made
regarding the right to counsel, and the case did not involve testimony
of the pre-trial identification. The challenge was solely to the incourt identification. 2
The Court began its analysis by allegedly following the Stovall
"totality test." The Court, however, delineated a more expansive definition of totality than the one established in Stovall6 3 The identification would be set aside only if it "was so impermissibly suggestive
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 4 While it was noted that this standard accords with the
Stovall standard, it is, in reality, the beginning of the dismantling of
the Wade trilogy's protections. Substitution of the word "permissible" for "unnecessarily" creates the impression that what may be
58. If the witness would have been able to identify the suspect regardless of the improper lineup, the independent source rule would permit the in-court identification. See Sobel,
supra note 8, at 268.
59. See Sobel, supra note 8, at 262 (finding that the Wade trilogy "left many problems
unsolved"); Recent Cases, supra note 52, at 763 (noting "a substantial amount of confusion");
Note, Due Process Standardsfor the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26
KANSAS L. REV. 461, 466 (1978) (discussing inconsistent and inconclusive results).
60. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
61. Id. at 382.
62. Id. at 382-83.
63. See N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 2; Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1108 (noting that
the reworded language of Simmons suggests a very different inquiry).
64. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
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"unnecessary" could still be "permissible." Moreover, replacing
"conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"' 5 with "a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification"66 requires a
much higher level of proof on the part of the defendant. 7 Therefore,
it appears that the two standards are not in accord, but rather in
disharmony.' 8, Furthermore, if the Court was seeking a standard in
accord with Stovall, it could have employed the Stovall standard
verbatim.
As a second step in dismantling the trilogy, the Court looked to
the circumstances of the crime itself in applying its reworded totality
test. ' 9 The Court is thus stating that the totality test looks not
merely at the totality of the identification procedure, but also to the
totality of the crime. When the test was first articulated in Stovall,
the Court did not look to the crime.7 0 The Court's inclusion of factors surrounding the crime in Simmons, however, makes it easier to
justify an in-court identification; the witness' identification can be
based on his or her observations of the crime, which are easier to
prove than the existence of an unbiased lineup.
The dismantling of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy had thus
begun. Two more cases were decided which continued the dismantling trend set in the Simmons decision: Neil v. Biggers 1 and Man72
son v. Brathwaite.
III. THE LATER CASES:

BIGGERS AND BRATHWAITE

Four years elapsed before the Court further defined the totality
standard. Neil v. Biggers 3 marked a shift away from the original
intent of Wade and continued the dismantling process begun in
Simmons. 4
65. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.

66. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
67. See Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1108 n.75 (noting that "[a]t a minimum the Simmons test served to increase the defendant's burden of proof.").
68. Id. at 1107, 1109 (noting that Simmons was a new formulation and that the two
tests were quite different).
69. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384-86. See Note, supra note 59, at 464-65 (concerning the
factual reliability of the identification or the actual guilt of the suspect).
70. See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. See also Grossmann, supra note 55, at 55 (noting that
Stovall never directly referred to external factors).
71. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
72. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).

73. 409 U.S. at 188.
74. In the opinion of one commentator, Biggers substantially dismantled the Wade trilogy. See Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1120.
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In Biggers, the defendant was convicted after a suggestive station house identification procedure which consisted of two detectives
walking the defendant past the victim. 5 The defendant objected to
the victim's in-court identification and her testimony concerning the
pre-trial identification. 6
The Court, perhaps in reaction to criticism being voiced by the
lower federal courts,77 gave its fullest enunciation of the totality test
to date. Three major points were made, all of which inured to the
benefit of the prosecution.
First, the Court held that any suggestiveness in the identification alone does not require the exclusion of pre-trial evidence, and
that the deciding issue is that of the identification's reliability, determined under the totality of the circumstances. 8 While suggestive
confrontations are "disapproved" and unnecessarily suggestive ones
are "condemned," the Court held that they nevertheless may be admissible if the identification was reliable. 9 In other words, police
misconduct will be tolerated as long as it does not affect reliability. 0
The focus thus moves away from what the police did wrong (suggestiveness) to what is left after discounting police errors (reliability).
As a result, the defendant's rights are further diminished, and the
Gilbert sanctions, which were designed to protect the defendant's interests, have been effectively reduced.
Second, five factors were given for evaluating the totality test:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime;81 (2) the witness' degree of attention during the crime; 82
(3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the accused compared to his actual appearance; 83 (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation;8 4 and (5) the length of
75.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 195.

76. Id. at 193.
77.

See supra note 55; see also Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir.

1968) (en banc) (opinions of McGowan, Leventhal, and Wright, JJ.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
964 (1969) (discussing problems arising in the application of the Stovall due process test).
78. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99.
79. Id. at 198.
80. The Court in Biggers was more concerned with unreliable evidence being used than
with unreliable procedures. See Note, supra note 59, at 466-67; Note, supra note 24, at 1083
n.44 (noting a shift from suggestiveness of the procedure to the reliability of the

identification).
81.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 (numbers added).

82. Id.
83.

Id.

84. Id.
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time between the crime and the confrontation.85
Three of the factors were taken from the Wade independent
source test.88 By expanding the totality test to include two additional
factors, it is easier to dilute the wrongdoings which occurred in the
identification procedure. Thus, police misconduct during the lineup
87
can be explained within the context of the crime itself.
Finally, the Court in Biggers held that the test to be used is one
which weighs the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
lineup against the level of suggestiveness present in the lineup.88 As
a result, the Court moved from the relatively objective tests of Gilbert and Stovall to a subjective test.8 9 The Biggers test first requires
the determination of suggestiveness under an expansive reading of
the totality test, and then, even if the lineup is found to be suggestive, it may still be used, if, after weighing all the factors surrounding the lineup, it is found to be reliable. Biggers, therefore, makes it
difficult for the defendant to prove suggestiveness, while at the same
time making it easier for the prosecution to use a suggestive identification.90 The courts are thus able to dismiss flagrant violations on a
finding of reliability,9" and the police have little to fear concerning
the suppression of suggestive identifications.9 2
The Court completed the demise of the Wade trilogy in its latest identification case, Manson v. Brathwaite.9 3 In Brathwaite, the
defendant was identified from a single photograph left by a police
85. Id. at 199-200.
86. The second, third, and fifth factors were taken from the Wade independent source
test. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
87. By expanding the number of factors in evaluating reliability, the weight of each
factor, including police misconduct, is reduced. See Grossman, supra note 55, at 108 (noting
that factors outside police control are often determinative under the expanded test); Sobel,
supra note 8, at 289 (suggesting that external factors which focus on an identification's accuracy should not be considered).
88. A substantial likelihood of misidentification must exist for a due process violation to
be found. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201.
89. By allowing witnesses to evaluate their own biases and by permitting judges to determine the impact of subtle suggestion, the Biggers Court's test for reliability is a highly subjective and impractical standard. See Note, supra note 59, at 472.
90. The Biggers Court's major concern was not the use of suggestive procedures, but
unreliable identifications. See Recent Cases, supra note 52, at 769; Note, supra note 24, at
1084 n.48 (suggesting that the burden shifts from the prosecution having to prove a fair identification procedure to the defense having to prove an unreliable identification).
91. See Grossman, supra note 55, at 60-61.
92. Id. at 68-69.
93. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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officer with an undercover officer. 94 No photo array 5 or lineup was
conducted."
Brathwaite marks the official end of the Gilbert per se rule. A

majority of the Court held that the rule went too far in its application because it kept reliable and relevant evidence from the jury."
The Court reconsidered the Gilbert rule's automatic application, and
desired the inclusion of alleviating factors.98
Brathwaite additionally held that "[t]he standard, after all, is
that of fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 Whether fairness is different than reliability
is not mentioned, and no criteria for determining fairness are
provided."'

0

The Court further held that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony .

..."101 Relia-

bility is to be determined by weighing the Biggers factors1 1 2 against
the corrupting influence of the suggestive identification. 0 3 Like the
Biggers balancing test, the Brathwaite test continued the trend away

from Wade. In Biggers, totality is weighed against the level of
suggestiveness.104 In Brathwaite, totality is weighed against the in-

fluence of suggestiveness. The prosecution is now free to argue that
even if suggestiveness was present, it did not influence the witnesses
when they viewed the lineup. 1°5 Admissibility is not based on police
wrongdoings, but on the reliability of the identification. 1°6
94. Id. at 101.
95. See supra note 8.
96. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 102.
97. Id. at 112.
98. The Court did not enunciate what these factors might be. Id. at 112. Additionally,
the Court failed to note the desirability of such an automatic rule; its simplicity of use by the
lower courts and its fairness to the defendant in that it leaves little room for subjective manipulation. The Court did note that the per se rule has the more significant deterrent effect, but
held that the expanded totality approach also has an "influence" on police behavior. The Court
ignored the difference between a deterrent and a mere "influence." Id.
99. Id. at 113.
100. See Grossman, supra note 55, at 58 (noting the Court's failure to articulate what
constitutes suggestion).
101. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
102. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
103. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. See Recent Cases, supra note 52, at 775 (analyzing
whether the corrupting effect is outweighed by the Biggers reliability factors).
104. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201.
105. One commentator has suggested that the permissive due process test provides the
prosecution with the means by which it may introduce at trial identification evidence obtained
during tainted pretrial proceedings. See Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1114.
106. See N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 3.3(b), at 9 (Supp. 1984) (stating that admissibility
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The dismantling of the Wade trilogy was completed with the
Brathwaite decision.10 7 As Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Brathwaite lamented, "Today's decision can come as no surprise to
those who have been watching the Court dismantle the protections
against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected a decade ago in
[Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall].' ' 08
IV.

LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS POST-BRATHWAITE

The effect of Brathwaite can plainly be seen in a number of
recent federal cases, 109 two of which are discussed below.
Carter v. Scully" ° combines the fact patterns of both Stovall
and Brathwaite. The victim, while hospitalized, was shown a single
photograph of the defendant, and made a positive identification. The
defendant contested the resulting in-court identification, contending
that it was irreparably tainted by the photographic showup."'a
Had this case been decided at the time of Gilbert, the court
most likely would have found the identification to have been suggestive. Consequently, the case would have been remanded to determine
if there was an independent source under the Wade criteria." 2
Since the case was decided after Brathwaite, the court held that
the Simmons standard" 3 was to be applied. Noting the recent federal developments, the majority held that "[tihis analysis has been
further refined by [Biggers and Brathwaite] requiring courts to consider whether, despite a suggestive confrontation, an identification is
reliable under the 'totality of the circumstances.' "I"
The court then proceeded to apply the rules from Biggers and
Brathwaite. After weighing all the Biggers factors," 5 the court concluded that "there was no substantial likelihood of irreparable mishinges on witness' memory, not on police conduct).
107.

Commentators have been highly critical of Brathwaite, noting that it has elimi-

nated the protections provided by the Wade trilogy. See N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 1.5, at 10, §
3.3(b), at 9; Decker, Moriarty, & Albert, The Demise of ProceduralProtectionin Laywitness
Identifications in Federal Court: Who Is the Culprit?, 9 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 335 (1978).
108. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. See cases cited in N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 4.2(d), at 8-13. Compare Allen v.

Estelle, 568 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1978) (permitting reliable testimony despite suggestive procedure) with United States v. Mann, 557 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) (excluding identification

testimony because it was unreliable).
110.

557 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Il. ld. at 628.
112. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.

113. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
114. Carter, 557 F.Supp. at 628-29.
115. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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identification," 116 and that the identification procedure was reliable.
There was no need to proceed to the second step outlined in
Brathwaite, determining the weight of the suggestive influence, since
no suggestive influence was found to exist. Later in the same opinion,
however, the court agreed with the trial court's finding that there
was an independent source for the identification, 117 a criterion not
required until after the second Brathwaite step, which itself was not
required. The Court seems to have confused the totality test1 18 with
the independent source test of Wade. 1 9 Totality applies to pre-trial
identifications, while independent source applies to in-court identifications. If the identification is reliable under the totality test, then
independent source becomes irrelevant and need not be determined.
Another recent case involving the application of Brathwaite is
United States v. Shakur.12 0 The defendants moved to dismiss all pretrial and in-court identification testimony based on a number of alleged improprieties, 21 the most important of which was the use of
allegedly obvious phony beards on the stand-ins in the lineup.'22
The court noted that "reliability is the linchpin" in determining
the admissibility of identification testimony, and that reliability is to
be determined by the "totality of the circumstances." 2 The Biggers
factors were then enumerated,1 24 which would seem to constitute the
totality test. The balancing tests used in Biggers and Brathwaite,
however, were not mentioned, and thus it appears that this court is
moving away from the subjective Supreme Court view. A simple application of the Biggers factors, without considering the effect of any
suggestiveness or without balancing the facts with any influence, is a
more objective way of determining reliability.
Shakur posed an interesting objection to the lineup; the fake
beards placed on some of the lineup participants were alleged to be
suggestive as they were obviously phony. 2 5 Rather than examine the
totality of the lineup, the totality of the crime, or the influence ef116.
117.

Carter, 557 F. Supp. at 630.
Id.

118.

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. Suggestiveness is determined by the totality of the

circumstances.
119. Even if the pre-trial identification was suggestive, the in-court identification will be

allowed if an independent source is established. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240-41.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

560 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 354.
See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
Shakur, 560 F. Supp. at 356 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 357.
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fected, the court proposed a more simple, objective test: fake beards
worn by stand-ins in a lineup do not render the lineup unduly suggestive when a determination of which stand-ins were wearing the
false beards could not be made from an examination of a photograph
of the lineup. 126 Such a standard is admirable for its simplicity and
objectivity, as it does not involve the weighing of factors or a balancing test. This standard does not require a reading of the witness'
minds, -or an evaluation of the crime, but simply a neutral third
party's judgment.
While Biggers and Brathwaite have given some shape to the
identification standards to be applied by the courts, these decisions
have made it more difficult for defendants because, as a result, the
case law in the past twenty years has taken on a position favorable to
the prosecution. The importance of the Wade trilogy has been
minimized.
V.

EVOLUTION OF THE NEW YORK IDENTIFICATION STANDARD

States cannot provide individuals with fewer due process rights
than those provided under the Constitution; individual states, however, are permitted to provide greater protection.127 Thus, as a result
of the Wade decision, New York was forced to determine how much
protection it should provide to defendants in criminal identification
cases.
One of the first post-Wade identification cases to be decided in
New York was People v. Ballot.2 8 In Ballot, the defendant was exhibited alone before the robbery victim, and instructed to wear clothing similar to that worn by the criminal."2 ' While the Court of Appeals noted that Wade was not to be applied retroactively, and thus
not applicable to the instant case, 30 it held that "a pretrial identifi126. Id.
127. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 128-29 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the state
courts remained free to interpret their own state constitutions to provide greater protection);
Recent Cases. supra note 52, at 775 (inviting states to depart from Brathwaite and establish,
under their state constitutions, a rule calling for the most reliable methods to be used). See
generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977) (discussing greater protections available under state constitutions).
128. 20 N.Y.2d 600, 233 N.E.2d 103, 286 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
129. Id. at 603, 233 N.E.2d at 104, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 3.
130. Id. at 605, 233 N.E.2d at 106, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 5. The court followed the decision
in Stovall, to not apply Wade and Gilbert retroactively. In Stovall, the defendant's habeas
corpus proceeding collaterally attacked his state conviction for the same errors alleged in
Wade and Gilbert, both of which reached the Court on direct review. Stovall thus gave the
Court the option to apply Wade and Gilbert retroactively, which it declined to do.
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cation procedure, even though not violative of the defendant's right
to counsel . . .may be so unfair as to amount to a denial of due

process of law." 13 ' Since it was faced with the question of excluding
an in-court identification, the court properly directed the trial13court
2
to apply the independent source test, and remanded the case.

The Court of Appeals was again faced with the issue of a
tainted identification in People v. Logan.133 The defendant urged
that the pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to erroneous identification and, therefore, it violated his
Stovall due process rights.'

The Logan court noted that the test to

be used is one of "fairness,"' 3 5 a standard adopted by the Supreme
3 6 The totality of circumCourt eight years later in Brathwaite.1

stances were considered, including the defendant's arrest and the
identification of his car,' 37 and the court held that the pre-trial identification was not so "unfair" as to violate due process. 3 8
This case seems to be in accord with Simmons' view of totality
which includes events extraneous to the identification,' 3 9 but the

court's rationale is unclear. The defendant urged the court to use the
Stovall standard, but after looking to the totality test, the court

merely announced that the identification was not unfair. ° Whether
the court's decision means not suggestive, suggestive but permissibly
so, or something else, is left to individual interpretation. "'
People v. Lebron," 2 decided five years after Logan, is a rare
case because all identifications, both pre-trial and in-court, were supThe Court felt that the Wade and Gilbert holdings were not foreshadowed; that law enforcement officials had acted on the premise that the Constitution did not require the presence
of counsel at pre-trial identifications; and that law enforcement authorities fairly relied on the
weight of authority. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 294, 296-301.
131. Ballot, 20 N.Y.2d at 605-06, 233 N.E.2d at 106, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 5. Both New
York as well as federal cases (including Stovall) were cited in support of this contention.
132. Id. at 607, 233 N.E.2d at 107, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
133. 25 N.Y.2d 184, 250 N.E.2d 454, 303 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1020 (1970).
134. Id. at 186, 250 N.E.2d at 455, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
135. Id. at 191, 250 N.E.2d at 457, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
136. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
137. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d at 192, 250 N.E.2d at 458, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
138. Id. at 193, 250 N.E.2d at 458, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
139. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
140. Logan, 25 N.Y.2d at 193, 250 N.E.2d at 458, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
141. The court properly noted, however, that once the identification was found to be
fair, no further inquiry, namely the Wade independent source test, was necessary. Id.
142. 46 A.D.2d 776, 360 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1974).
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3 The defendant, a Hispanic, was convicted
pressed.14'
of murder and
attempted robbery after being placed in a lineup with four other
men, all of whom were Caucasian and only one of whom possibly
resembled him. 144 The court, perhaps because of the clearly apparent
nature of the suggestive conduct, did not spell out the test it used to
determine suggestiveness, but merely stated the facts and arrived at
the conclusion that the lineup was "unduly suggestive. 1 1 45 The opinion later notes, however, that the lineup was "unnecessarily suggestive," possibly indicating a reliance on the Stovall standard. 146
Interestingly, in determining fairness, no reference was made to
totality, the test used earlier in Logan,1 47 or to the Biggers reliability
standard and balancing test.1 48 The fact that the court looked only to
the lineup itself and not to the mitigating factors examined in Logan
and Biggers may indicate a preference for a simpler, more objective
test, which is contrary to the practice that developed in the federal
courts.
Having concluded that the lineup was suggestive, the court then
followed the precedent set in Ballot and applied the Wade independent source test.149 The court, in a rare decision, found that no
source for an independent identification had been proven to exist,
and, as a result, a total suppression of identification testimony was
ordered.1 50
Any divergence from the federal standard which may have existed in Lebron disappeared in People v. Smith, 51 which marked a
return to the more lenient federal standard. After being apprehended
as a suspect in a bank robbery, the defendant was driven to the bank
and identified by the witness while he was sitting in the back of the
police car next to another man. 52 In response to the defendants contention that the showup was improperly suggestive, the court re-

143. Id. at 778, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The court cites no federal cases, but the language would indicate a preference for
the Stovall, rather than the Simmons, standard. Id.
147. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 78-79 and 88-89 and accompanying text.
149. It should be noted that the court did not look to the reliability of the identification.
After the initial finding of suggestiveness, the Wade independent source test was applied.
Lebron, 46 A.D.2d at 778, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
150. Id.
151. 63 A.D.2d 754, 404 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1978).
152. Id. at 754-55, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
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turned to the fairness standard of Logan.153 The Smith court mea-

sured fairness by the "reasonableness of the police actions in light of
the surrounding circumstances. 1 54 This test was an entirely new
formula. It did not weigh the suggestive effect of the lineup vis-a-vis
totality, but whether the police action was reasonable within the total circumstances of the case. This was the first and last appearance
to date of this test.

The trend toward the federal standard continued in People v.
Walker. 55 In Walker, the defendant was captured by a rape victim's
friends, who then turned him over to the police and identified him.'"
This constituted the sole in-person, pre-trial identification. Citing
post-Simmons state and federal decisions, including Brathwaite and
Smith, the court concluded that the due process protection is one

against unreliable evidence rather than the use of unreliable procedures. 57 If the evidence of an identification is reliable, it does not
matter that the procedures used to obtain it were unreliable. This
indicates a complete departure from the concepts of the Wade tril-

ogy, which provided sanctions aimed directly at unreliable police
153. The court held that a denial of due process results from an unfair identification
procedure and that fairness is measured "in light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. at
755, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 747. This is an entirely different test than that applied in Lebron. Id.
While not citing to Brathwaite,Smith post-dates Brathwaite and could reflect the Brathwaite
court's approval of the fairness standard. As further evidence of this possibility, the Smith
opinion notes that "instantaneous show-up identifications.., are productive of reliable identifications," Id. at 755, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 747 in much the same way that Brathwaite held that
"reliability is the linchpin." 432 U.S. at 114. The focus in Smith shifts from the reliability of
the procedures to the reliability of the identification.
154. Smith, 63 A.D.2d at 755, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
155. 97 Misc. 2d 171, 411 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1978).
156. Id. at 172, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
157. In a curious twist, the court noted that a common justification for showups which
are conducted at the scene is that such on-scene showups are apt to be productive of reliable
identifications, since there is such a short delay factor between the crime and identification. Id.
at 173, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 158. Contra Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1104 (stating that one person
showups are particularly conducive to misidentificaton); Note, supra note 10, at 782 (severely
criticizing showup practices); Note, Due Process Considerations in Police Showup Practices,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 377, 392 (1969) (discussing dangers in showups); Note, supra note 24, at
1082 n.32 (noting that showups are often presumed suggestive). While it may be true that the
short delay between the crime and the identification may be helpful, it is also true that the
mental state of the victim shortly after the crime is not one productive to fair and unprejudiced
reasoning, especially in the context of a showup.
In a recent development, Manhattan State Supreme Court Justice Atlas held that model
Marla Hanson's on-the-scene identification of the two men who allegedly slashed her face was
the product of an unduly suggestive showup, and thus had to be suppressed. In contrast to the
Walker holding, Justice Atlas said, "It is clear that on-the-scene show-ups are suggestive.
They imply that the police suspect the person presented." Model's ID of 2 Rejected, New
York Newsday, Feb. 27, 1987, at 9, col.4.
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procedures. 158 The Walker court further held that the concept of per
se suggestiveness, as applied to an in-court identification, "is not, and
has never been the law" in New York.159 New York applies the independent source rule which allows an in-court identification despite a
suggestive lineup, something a strict per se rule would not allow. The
court went on to discuss reliability (Biggers) and fairness
(Brathwaite) and stated that the Wade hearing 60 should perhaps
now more aptly be called a Biggers/Brathwaite hearing. 6 ' This is
strong judicial testimony concerning the change in judicial thinking
from the Wade protections to the Brathwaite leniency.
The trend towards New York's adoption of Brathwaite reached
its apex in In re Mark J.,1 12 where the victim was robbed by three
black youths, one of whom was the defendant. 6 3 A lineup was later
conducted at the scene, with the three black youths and two white
youths.164 The victim identified the three black youths as the ones
who had robbed her. In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge Aileen
Schwartz identified the threshold issue as being whether Brathwaite
represents the New York standard governing pre-trial and in-court
identifications, or whether a more protective due process test, namely
the one established in the Wade trilogy, is mandated by New York
law. 16 5 In order to determine this, Judge Schwartz conducted a thorough survey of both the federal and New York case law, and
reached a number of conclusions.
First, the court noted the indecisiveness of the Court of Appeals,
stating, "[T]here has been no definitive statement by the [New York
158. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
159. Walker, 97 Misc. 2d at 173, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
160. A Wade hearing occurs when a question arises concerning an identification procedure that has possibly violated a constitutional right. The hearing is made outside the presence
of a jury, and concerns not the in-court identification, but only the pre-trial identification. It is
provided for by statute in New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710 (McKinney 1984), and in
many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-8-3 (West 1986); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 703 (West 1981); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01 (Vernon 1987);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31 (West 1985). See also Sobel, supra note 8, at 318-21 (discussing

the procedures involved in a suppression hearing).
161. Walker, 97 Misc. 2d at 174-75, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
162. 96 Misc. 2d 733, 412 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Fam. Ct. 1979).
163. Id. at 734, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 549-50.
164. The lineup took place approximately one half hour after the robbery. While the
victim originally described the three youths as boys from nine to twelve years old and from
four foot sixto five feet three inches tall, the youths she identified were from fourteen to over
sixteen years old, and were estimated by a police witness to be from five feet to five feet four
inches tall. Id. at 735-36, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
165. Id. at 736, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
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Court of Appeals] addressing the per se exclusionary rule vs. [sic]
the 'reliability under the totality of the circumstances' rule debate
subsequent to Manson v. Brathwaite .

*...""'

While there seems to

be no such definite statement, the development of the New York
case law on the subject paralleled federal case law, as seen through
the cases discussed above.
Second, the court noted that while the cases do not articulate a
fixed doctrine defining the New York standard, they do indicate a
preference for the reliability under the totality of the circumstances
test, citing Logan and Ballot as supporting this theory. 167 In reaching this conclusion, Logan was of major importance because it was
viewed as a precursor to Brathwaite.6 8 Apparently of the opinion
that the federal law was paralleling the New York law, instead of
the other way around, the court concluded that Brathwaite was the
governing law in New York.16 9 Choosing to ignore Lebron,70° the
court held that Logan was the landmark case in New York on the
subject, noting that it was often cited. 17 1 The emphasis in Logan was
on fairness, which was the same standard used in Brathwaite.Therefore, the Brathwaite fairness holding was said to be controlling.
Third, the Mark J. opinion applied the Brathwaite criteria in a
step-by-step analysis and then weighed the affect of those criteria
vis-a-vis the suggestive lineup. The evidence did not permit a finding
of a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and
the pre-trial identification was held to be reliable.17 2 Considering the
facts of the lineup (three black suspects with two white stand-ins), a
contrary result would likely have been reached if a per se standard
had been applied.
People v. Johnson17 1 marked the beginning of a trend away
from the permissiveness of the Brathwaite standard. The defendant
in the case was the only suspect in a lineup wearing a plaid jacket,
which had figured prominently in the witness' description of the susId. at 742, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
Id. at 743, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
The court held, "'People v. Logan ... in language and substance represents the
under the totality of the circumstances' approach as later enunciated in Manson v.
Brathwaite .
I...
Id.
169. Id.
170. The court noted that "notwithstanding other New York decisions seeming to apply
166.
167.
168.
.reliability

a per se exclusionary standard" Logan was the controlling New York case. Id.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 744-45, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
79 A.D.2d 617, 433 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1980).
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pect.1 74 While the trial court found this was not impermissibly suggestive, 17 5 the appellate court held that it was unnecessarily suggestive, 171 indicating that the court did not consider the two standards
to be equivalent, 17 and indicating a shift back toward the Wade
standard. 78 In addition, neither Logan nor Brathwaite, supposedly
the two controlling cases in New York, were used as authority, but
Lebron, a case which did not look to totality or reliability, was cited.
Moreover, the Johnson court looked only to the lineup itself.1 79 The
focus on the lineup would seem to point toward a disapproval of
Brathwaite as controlling authority in New York. Though the
suggestiveness prohibited testimony concerning the pre-trial identification, independent source was found, so that an in-court identification was not suppressed.180 This decision is in accord with the
Walker holding that a strict per se rule, as applied to an in-court
identification, is not the New York law. 81
People v. Adams 82 is perhaps the most important New York
case on the subject of pre-trial identifications. The defendant and
two co-defendants were identified in a showup in which they were
the only participants, with a police officer holding them from behind. 83 The New York Court of Appeals first held that the trial
court's determination of independent source was supported by sufficient evidence and thus beyond review. The opinion went on to state,
however, that "under no view of the evidence could it be said that
the station house identification was not suggestive." 8 4 The court reviewed the circumstances of the showup in some detail, but did not
consider it necessary to include factors outside of the showup. 85 No
reliability tests were made, no balancing test, and no standards were
174. Id. at 618, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
175. Id. The trial court was apparently using the Simmons standard See supra notes
60-70 and accompanying text.
176. The Appellate Division applied the Stovall standard, citing People v. Lebron, 46
A.D.2d 776, 360 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1974). See supra notes 50-63, 142-150 and accompanying

text.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Johnson, 79 A.D.2d at 618, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
Id.
Id.

181.
182.

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).

183.

In addition to the defendants being the only showup participants, the witnesses

were informed by a police officer that he thought they had the robbers. Id. at 246, 423 N.E.2d

at 381, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
184.
185.

Id. at 248, 423 N.E.2d at 382-83, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id.
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given." 6 Having concluded that an independent source existed (thus
permitting an in-court identification), and that the pre-trial identification was suggestive, the court was left to decide whether testimony
of the pre-trial identification should be allowed.
If the Court of Appeals had followed Brathwaite, as the family
court had done in Mark J., there is a chance that the identification
would have been allowed. Contrary to Mark J., however, the court
in Adams stated, "We have never held that it is proper to admit
evidence of a suggestive pretrial identification. Indeed it seems to
have been understood ...

that a pretrial identification would not be

admissible if the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive."' 87 The
use of the phrase "unnecessarily suggestive" implies that the Stovall
standard is to be used, and the entire statement appears to indicate a
return to the Gilbert per se exclusionary rule for pre-trial
identifications."' 8
Judge Wachtler justified this position by noting that the New
York Court of Appeals was concerned with the risk of misidentification "[1]ong before the Supreme Court entered the field,"'8 19 and that
"the State Constitution affords additional protections above the bare
minimum mandated by Federal law."' 190 The Court of Appeals held
that the per se rule was necessary to reduce the risk that an innocent
person would be convicted as a result of suggestive identification
procedures.''
People v. Sapp' 92 followed the Adams standard and applied it
to a case in which the defendant was the only member of a lineup
wearing a "lamb jacket," which had figured "prominently" in the
witness' description. 9 ' The lineup was found to be unnecessarily
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 251-52, 423 N.E.2d at 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
188. Id. See N. SOBEL, supra note 6, § 4.2(d), at II (Supp. 1986) (noting that New
York, under its state constitution, holds to its pre-Brathwaiteanalysis).

189.

Adams, 53 N.Y.2d at 250, 423 N.E.2d at 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 906.

190.

Id.

191.

Cooke, C.J., concurring in a separate opinion, in which Gabrielli, J., joined, noted

that the Adams decision created a separate state constitutional rule, based on a per se exclusionary standard. They found the Brathwaite rule to be "far preferable" in that it would admit
"reliable out-of-court identifications." Id. at 252, 423 N.E.2d at 384, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
192.

98 A.D.2d 784, 469 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1983).

193. Id. at 784, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The use of the word "prominently" would indicate that a lineup involving clothing which was just one part of a lengthy description would not
lead to suggestiveness should the suspect be wearing it at the time of the identification. See
Plummer v. State, 270 Ark. 11, 603 S.W.2d 402 (1980) (holding lineup proper, despite defendant's wearing clothes almost identical to those reported in witness' description, because the
clothes were of little significance in witness' identification); Griffin v. State, 356 So. 2d 723
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suggestive, and thus, following Adams, testimony concerning the
pre-trial identification was suppressed. The Sapp court did not look

to the totality test, to factors outside the identification, or to its reliability. It examined the lineup solely.194 The court then applied the
Wade independent source test and allowed an in-court identification
to be made. 195

People v. Tatum'9 6 is final evidence of the difference between
the federal and New York standards. The defendant was a black
man with a glass eye and was identified from a lineup in which he
was the only member with that distinguishing feature.1 97 The court
acknowledged that Brathwaite held that "reliability is the linchpin," 01 8 but then stated that the New York Court of Appeals has
noted that New York provides additional constitutional protections
above those provided by the federal government. 99 The court further
stated that "if the identification procedure used was 'unduly suggestive' or 'unnecessarily suggestive' then testimony concerning any outof-court identification made would be inadmissible, regardless of the
reliability of the identification. ' 20 0 The court noted that by suppressing any testimony arising from suggestive lineups, "a burden
[would be placed] on the police to exercise care when conducting
lineups. ' ' 201 This reasoning differs from the federal rationale that a
subjective view of the evidence is what counts, rather than improper
procedures.202
VI.
The standard

used

CONCLUSION
in the federal

system

is found in

(Ala. Crim. App.)(noting that witnesses testified that suspect's distinctive clothing was not the
pivotal identifying factor), cert. denied, Ex parte Griffin, 356 So. 2d 728 (1978). Cf. United
States v. Barron, 575 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1978 ) (holding lineup fair even though defendant
was only one in lineup with a big nose, because some of the witnesses also emphasized his
beady eyes and oddly shaped lips in their descriptions).
194. 98 A.D.2d at 784, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
195. Id.
196. 129 Misc. 2d 196, 492 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
197. Id. at 203, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. The court referred to the defendant's "uniquely
distinguishing facial appearance," his "facial deformity," and his "remarkable" facial characteristics, before mentioning that the defendant had a glass eye. Id. at 200-01, 492 N.Y.S.2d at
1003.
198. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
199. Tatum, 129 Misc. 2d at 202-03, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05.
200. Id. at 203, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 204, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
202. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114.
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Brathwaite.°a This standard permits in-court testimony of a suggestive lineup if it is found to be reliable. The federal standard, however, is diametrically opposed to the current New York standard
found in Adams," 4 which does not permit any testimony concerning
a suggestive lineup.
In order to determine which rule better serves society's interests,
there must be an analysis of the reasons behind the establishment of
these rules.2 0 5 First, these rules were adopted, in part, to curtail improper police behavior while conducting identifications. In order to
secure convictions, the police have gone so far as to place one woman
in a lineup composed otherwise entirely of men, 206 one Asian ina
lineup with five Caucasians, 0 7 one black in a lineup with two whites
and one Mexican, 20 8 and in New York, one Puerto Rican with five
whites. 20 9 These excesses all occurred in the context of a lineup, considered by courts and commentators to be the fairest of the identification procedures. 10 Of equal concern to the courts was reducing
the use of showups, a practice widely condemned by the courts and
commentators.2
Second, it is of paramount importance in our criminal justice
system that a person receive a fair trial, and that innocent men are
not found guilty. Since the primary reason for improper convictions
203.
204.

432 U.S. 98 (1977).
53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1981).

205. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111-12.
206.
207.

State v. Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1967).
Regina v. Armstrong, 125 C. C. C. 56 (1959), noted in Murray, supra note 18, at

623.
208. People v. Hogan, 264 Cal. App. 2d 254, 70 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1968).
209. People v. Lebron, 46 A.D.2d 776, 360 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1974). See also People v.
Mendoza, 72 A.D.2d 608, 421 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1979) (finding that defendant and co-defendant

were the only Puerto Ricans in the lineup, as well as the shortest, the heaviest, and the only
ones with beards).

210. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968)(Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting). Chief Judge Bazelon wrote, "I believe that due process is violated whenever the

police unjustifiably fail to hold a lineup. Since mistaken identifications are probably the greatest cause of erroneous convictions, we must require the fairest identification procedures avail-

able under the circumstances." Id. at 1262 (footnote omitted).
211.

See, e.g., Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. The Court stated, "The practice of showing

suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has
been widely condemned." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1104
(noting that one person showups are particularly conducive to misidentification); Note, supra
note 10, at 782 (severely criticizing showup practices); Note, Due Process Considerations in
Police Showup Practices,44 N.Y.U. L. REV.377, 392 (1969) (noting the dangers in showups);

Note, supra note 24, at 1082 n.32 (stating showups are often presumed suggestive).
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is mistaken identification, 1 2 standards governing the conduct of pretrial identifications are essential. Steps had to be taken to insure that
these pre-trial identifications are conducted both fairly and free of
bias.
How do the standards enunciated in Brathwaite and Adams
meet these two concerns? Under Brathwaite, the showup has flourished, because the totality approach has failed to discourage this
practice.2 13 As a deterrent to suggestive police practices, the federal

standard is quite weak.2 14 Almost any suggestive lineup will still
meet reliability standards. 1 5 The Brathwaite standard has failed to
meet the concerns of Wade, which stressed the need to control police
misbehavior. 16
In New York, however, a state which has expressly declined to
follow Brathwaite, court decisions have put greater pressure on the
police to conduct fair lineups. In cases such as Sapp and Tatum,
testimony of pre-trial identifications was suppressed as a result of
police misconduct. If the state should desire to have such evidence
available to it, care must be taken to insure a suggestion-free lineup.
The federal standard permits juries to be influenced by police
misconduct by allowing in-court identifications to be bolstered by
testimony of suggestive pre-trial identifications.2 17 The fact that a
judge makes a determination of reliability is of little comfort, considering the subjectivity involved in the test.21 8 In New York, however,
212. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 & n.6. See also E. BORCHARD, Convicting the Innocent
at xiii (1932), cited in Grossman, supra note 55, at 65 (discussing the dangers of wrongful
convictions because of misidentification); Murray, supra note 18, at 610 (noting that eyewitness identification is the most unreliable form of proof); Note, supra note 59, at 462 (concluding that eyewitness identification is peculiarly susceptible to inaccuracy and injustice).
213. Grossman, supra note 55, at 59-60.
214. Professor Grossman has noted that "even intentional or flagrant suggestive conduct
might produce no negative consequences for the police under the totality of circumstances
approach." Grossman, supra note 55, at 59. See also Grossman, supra note 55, at 58-63 (discussing deterrence effect); Note, supra note 59, at 472, 473 (doubting that police will be at all
deterred by the reliability rule); Note, supra note 10, at 819 (finding that police have not been
motivated to provide unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification procedures).
215. See, e.g., Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1979), afid sub nom.,
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (holding lineup suggestive because defendant was of
lighter complexion than other lineup members, but finding it to be reliable based on the totality of the circumstances).
216. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
217. See Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1120 (Biggers will even permit the use of bolstering
evidence obtained from a suggestive lineup).
218. See Grossman, supra note 55, at 69 (noting that reliability standard leaves much
open to judicial interpretation); Pulaski, supra note 23, at 1113 (noting ease in which lower
courts find an independent source).
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only evidence concerning a properly conducted lineup can be used
against a defendant, and this guarantees him the fairest possible
trial. As a result, mistaken eyewitness testimony is much less likely
to become part of the prosecution's case.
In summary, the conclusion which must be reached is that the
federal courts no longer evince the advances made in criminal law by
Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall. It is only by returning to a standard
similar to the one used in New York that the goals of the Wade
trilogy, namely sanctions on police misconduct and a fair trial for
defendants, will be met.
David E. Paseltiner
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